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Abstract | In 1633, the Inquisition condemned Galileo for defending Copernicus’s hypothesis of 
the earth’s motion and denying the scientific authority of Scripture. This ended the original contro-
versy, but generated a new one that continues today, for example, about whether the condemnation 
proves the incompatibility between science and religion. Recently the Galileo affair has been studied 
by several scholars whom I label “Berkeley para-clericals,” chiefly philosopher Paul Feyerabend and 
historian John Heilbron. Their approach is distinctive: it views controversial topics involving the re-
lationship between science and religion from a perspective that is secular-minded, but appreciative 
of religion, and yet conducted in the belief that such topics are too important to leave to religious 
believers. This approach also characterizes the work of other Berkeley para-clericals, such as Ronald 
Numbers on the controversy over creationism and evolutionism; they stress such attitudes as impar-
tiality, judiciousness, and even-handedness.
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Introduction
The main aim of this essay is to call attention to the existence of a distinctive approach to the 
study of the Galileo affair, and more generally to 
questions of science vs. religion. Such an approach 
can be detected in the works of philosopher Paul 
Feyerabend and historian John Heilbron. I shall ar-
gue that, despite the many other differences between 
Feyerabend and Heilbron, they both approach the af-
fair with a perspective which is secular-minded, but 
appreciative of religion, and yet conducted in the be-
lief that the affair is one of those topics that are too 
important to leave to religious believers. I label such 
an approach the “Berkeley para-clerical” approach be-
cause it is practiced not only by these two luminaries 
of the University of California, Berkeley, but also by 
other scholars who are graduates of the same institu-
tion. One of these is the distinguished historian Ron-
ald Numbers, who has studied the controversy over 
evolution and creationism. The analysis of the work 
of these other scholars leads us to a deeper under-
standing of this para-clerical approach in terms of a 
family of notions such as impartiality, judiciousness, 
objectivity, non-partisanship, even-handedness, and 
balanced judgment.
A Summary of the Galileo Affair
It will be useful to begin with a succinct summary of 
the Galileo affair.1 In 1543, Copernicus published an 
epoch-making book, On the Revolutions of the Heav-
enly Spheres. In it, he advanced an argu ment in favor of 
the idea that the earth rotates daily on its axis and re-
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volves yearly around the sun. The argument amounted 
to showing that the known facts about the motion of 
heavenly bodies could be explained better on the basis 
of the heliocentric geokinetic hypothesis than on the 
basis of Ptolemy’s geocentric geostatic theory.
Although novel and significant, Copernicus’s argu-
ment was hypothetical and inconclusive. Moreover, 
there were many arguments against the earth’s mo-
tion, stemming from astronomical observation, Aris-
totelian physics, traditional epistemology, and scrip-
tural interpretation. These objections were advanced 
by astronomers, mathematicians, and natural philos-
ophers, as well as theologians and churchmen, and by 
Protestants as well as Catholics. They can be summa-
rized as follows.
The earth’s motion seemed philosophically and epis-
temologically absurd because it contradicted direct 
sense experience; in fact, neither Copernicus nor an-
yone else could see, feel, or otherwise perceive the 
earth’s motion. From the perspective of the science of 
motion, the motion of the earth seems physically im-
possible because the available laws of motion (stem-
ming from Aristotle) implied that bodies on a rotat-
ing earth would, for example, follow a slanted rather 
than vertical path in free fall, and would be thrown 
off by centrifugal force. From the point of view of as-
tronomy, the earth’s motion seemed to be empirically 
false because it had consequences that could not be 
observed; for example, terrestrial and heavenly bod-
ies would have to have similar physical properties; 
the planet Venus would have to exhibit phases similar 
to those of the moon; and the fixed stars would have 
to undergo a yearly shift in their apparent position, 
called annual stellar parallax. Finally, the earth’s mo-
tion seemed theologically heretical because it contra-
dicted the words and the traditional interpretations 
of Scripture, such as the passage in Joshua 10:12-13.
Thus, Copernicanism attracted few followers. Galileo 
himself, in the first twenty years of his career (1589-
1609), was not one of them. His stance toward Coper-
nicanism then was one of indirect pursuit, an attitude 
that is not only weaker than acceptance, but also weak-
er than direct pursuit: his research focused on physics 
rather than astronomy; he was critical of Aristotelian 
physics and favorably inclined toward an Archime-
dean approach; he had intuited that the Copernican 
hypothesis of the earth’s motion was more consistent 
with the new science of motion he was developing 
than was the geostatic theory; but at that time he felt 
that, overall, the arguments against Copernicanism 
were stronger than those in favor of it.
However, in 1609-1610, by means of the newly in-
vented telescope, Galileo made several startling dis-
coveries, which he immediately published in a book 
entitled The Sidereal Messenger: that the moon’s sur-
face is rough, full of mountains and valleys; that in-
numerable other stars exist besides those visible with 
the naked eye; that the Milky Way and what had been 
traditionally called nebulas are dense collections of 
large numbers of individual stars; and that the planet 
Jupiter has four moons revolving around it at different 
distances and with different periods. Soon thereafter, 
he also discovered the phases of Venus and sunspots; 
and in 1613, he published a book On Sunspots.
The new telescopic evidence removed most of the 
observational-astronomical objections against the 
earth’s motion and added new evidence in its favor. 
Galileo now believed not only that the geokinetic 
theory had greater explanatory coherence than the 
geostatic theory (as Copernicus had shown); not only 
that it was physically and mechanically more ade-
quate (as Galileo’s new physics suggested); but also 
that it was em pirically and observationally more accu-
rate in astronomy (as the telescope now revealed). His 
assessment was now that the arguments and evidence 
for the earth’s motion were collectively stronger than 
those for the earth being at rest; in other words, that 
Copernicanism was more likely to be true than the 
geostatic world view. However, he realized that this 
strengthening of Copernicanism was not equivalent 
to settling the issue, because there was still some as-
tronomical counter-evidence (mainly, the lack of an-
nual stellar parallax); because the physical objections 
had not yet been explicitly refuted and the physics of a 
moving earth had not yet been published; and because 
the scriptural objection had not yet been answered.
Besides realizing that the pro-Copernican arguments 
were still not ab solutely conclusive, Galileo must have 
also perceived the potentially ex plosive character of 
the scriptural objection. In fact, for a number of years 
he did not get involved despite the fact that his Side-
real Messenger had been attacked by several authors on 
biblical grounds, among others. Even tually, however, 
he was dragged into the theological discussion. He 
was careful enough not to publish his criticism of the 
scriptural objection, but to circulate it privately, in the 
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form of letters. The first one, in 1613, was addressed 
to his former student Benedetto Castelli, professor of 
mathematics at the University of Pisa, while a more 
elaborate version, in 1615, was addressed to the Grand 
Duchess Christina, mother of Cosimo II de’ Medici, 
grand duke of Tuscany.
Galileo’s criticism, although complex and liable to mis-
understanding, was logically compelling, rhetorically 
persuasive, and theologically sophisticated. And in this 
context, it should be stressed that his efforts were par-
allel and complementary with those of other progres-
sive Catholic theologians and philosophers, such as 
Paolo Antonio Foscarini and Tommaso Campanella.
However, despite winning this intellectual argument, 
Galileo lost the practical struggle. In 1615, after some 
formal complaints were filed against him, the Inquisi-
tion launched an investigation. The proceedings lasted 
about a year, and the results were the following. In 
1616, the Congregation of the Index issued a decree 
declaring that the doctrine of the earth’s motion was 
physically false and contrary to Scripture; it also con-
demned and permanently banned Foscarini’s book 
entitled Letter on the Pythagorean Opinion (1615), 
which had argued that the earth’s motion was proba-
ble and not contrary to Scripture; and it temporarily 
prohibited Copernicus’s book On the Revolutions, un-
til and unless it was revised. Although Galileo was not 
mentioned at all in the decree, in private he was given 
a warning.
This warning exists in two versions. One is written on 
a certificate given to Galileo and signed by Cardinal 
Robert Bellarmine, who was an authoritative member 
of both the Congregations of the Index and of the In-
quisition; it states that Bellarmine informed Galileo 
that, in light of the Index’s decree, the earth’s motion 
could not be held or defended. The second version is in 
an unsigned note written by a notary and found in the 
file of Inquisition trial proceedings; it states that the 
commissary general of the Inquisition gave Galileo 
the special injunction not to hold, defend, or discuss 
in any way the earth’s motion. The difference between 
Bellarmine’s friendly warning and the commissary’s 
special injunction is that the latter adds a more strin-
gent prohibition to the one mentioned in the former: 
besides being prohibited, like other Catholics, to hold 
and defend the Copernican opinion, Galileo in addi-
tion was specially forbidden to discuss it in any way 
whatever.
For the next several years, Galileo behaved as if he 
was bound by Bellarmine’s warning, but as if he had 
no knowledge of the special injunction. That is, he 
refrained from supporting or defending the earth’s 
motion, although he discussed it incidentally in the 
context of a controversy over comets. The situation 
changed in 1623, when an admirer of Galileo, Cardi-
nal Maffeo Barberini, became Pope Urban VIII. From 
several indications, Galileo came to the conclusion 
that if he exercised the proper care, he could publish a 
book on the dangerous topic.
Thus, in 1632, Galileo published a work entitled Di-
alogue on the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and 
Copernican. The book was obviously a discussion of 
the earth’s motion, but the discussion took the form 
of a critical examination of all the arguments for and 
against the idea; the arguments on both sides were 
presented, analyzed, and evaluated. He tried his best 
to carry out his evaluation fairly and validly. The ar-
guments for the earth’s motion turned out to be much 
better than those against it. This was at worst an im-
plicit defense of Copernicanism.
Galileo’s hope and gamble was that friendly Church 
officials would not blame him for this; that they would 
recognize that the defense was not explicit; and that 
therefore they would judge that he had acted within 
the spirit of Bellarmine’s warning. Galileo’s attempt 
misfired not because it was foolhardy or unreasonable, 
but because in 1632 the special injunction came to the 
surface, and from its point of view any discussion of 
the earth’s motion by Galileo was prohibited, whether 
or not it amounted to a defense. Thus, in the fall of 
that year he was summoned to Rome to face the In-
quisition.
The proceedings did not begin until April. At the first 
hearing, Galileo was asked about the events of 1616 
and the Dialogue of 1632. He admitted receiving from 
Bellarmine the warning that the earth’s motion could 
not be held or defended, but only discussed hypothet-
ically. He denied receiving a special injunction not to 
discuss the topic in any way whatever, and in his de-
fense he introduced the certificate he had obtained 
from Bellarmine in 1616 which only mentioned the 
prohibition to hold or defend. Galileo also claimed 
that the book did not really defend the earth’s motion, 
but rather suggested that the favorable arguments 
were inconclusive, and so did not violate Bellarmine’s 
warning.
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The special injunction must have surprised Galileo as 
much as Bellarmine’s certificate surprised the inquisi-
tors. In fact, it took three weeks before they decided on 
the next step. The inquisitors opted for what might be 
called out-of-court plea-bargaining: they would not 
press the most serious but most questionable charge 
(namely, violation of the special injunction), but Gal-
ileo would have to plead guilty to a lesser and more 
provable charge (namely, transgression of the warning 
not to defend Copernicanism). He decided to cooper-
ate, but requested a few days to devise a dignified way 
of pleading guilty to the lesser charge.
Thus, at later hearings, he stated that the first deposition 
had prompted him to re-read his book. He was sur-
prised to find that it gave readers the impression that the 
author was defending the earth’s motion, even though 
this had not been his intention. He attributed his error 
to wanting to appear clever by making the weaker side 
look stronger. He was sorry and ready to make amends.
The trial ended on 22 June 1633 with a harsher sen-
tence than Galileo had been led to believe. The ver-
dict found him guilty of a category of religious crime 
intermediate between the most and the least serious, 
called “vehement suspicion of heresy”; the suspicious-
ly heretical beliefs were the cosmological thesis that 
the earth moves and the methodological principle 
that the Bible is not a scientific authority. Thus, he 
was forced to recite a humiliating “abjuration.” And 
the Dialogue was banned.
The sentence also states that he was to be held in pris-
on indefinitely. However, this particular penalty was 
immediately commuted to house arrest. Accordingly, 
for about one week he was confined to Villa Medici, 
a sumptuous palace in Rome belonging to the Tuscan 
grand duke. Then for about five months he was sent 
to the residence of Siena’s archbishop, who was a good 
friend of Galileo’s. Finally, in December 1633 he was 
allowed to live in seclusion at his own villa in Arcetri, 
near Florence.2
While the Inquisition’s condemnation in 1633 ended 
the original Galileo affair, it gave rise to a new one 
that continues to our own day. To begin to make sense 
of it, I stress that the subsequent affair has three prin-
cipal aspects: the historical aftermath; the critical is-
sues; and the reflective commentary.
The historical aftermath consists of facts and events 
directly stemming from the trial. Here, we can just 
highlight the actions taken by the Church. In 1740 to 
1758, Pope Benedict XIV allowed the partial unban-
ning of Galileo’s Dialogue and of Copernican books 
in general. In 1820 to 1835, there was a total repeal of 
the prohibition of the Copernican doctrine. In 1893, 
Pope Leo XIII published an encyclical containing 
an implicit theological vindication of Galileo’s bib-
lical hermeneutics, although his name was not even 
mentioned. In 1942, during the commemoration of 
the tricentennial of Galileo’s death, several Church 
officials started publicizing an appreciation of Gal-
ileo-the-person, as a model of harmony between 
science and religion. And in 1979-1992, Pope (now 
Saint) John Paul II undertook a further “rehabilita-
tion”3 of Galileo.
The critical issues of the subsequent controversy in 
part reflect the original issues. However, the subse-
quent controversy has also acquired a life of its own, 
with debates over new issues, such as whether the 
condemnation of Galileo illustrates the incompatibil-
ity between science and religion. Indeed, traditionally 
this condemnation has been viewed as epitomizing 
such a conflict. Here, it is important to note that this 
view has been advanced not only by relatively inju-
dicious authors such as Draper (1875) and ƒWhite 
(1896), who have recently been widely discredited (cf. 
Brooke 1991; Lindberg and Numbers 1987), but also 
by such scientific, philosophical, and cultural icons as 
Einstein (1953), ´Russell ([1935] 1997), and Popper 
(1963).
The reflective commentary on the original trial con-
sists of countless interpretations and evaluations 
advanced in the past four centuries by astronomers, 
physicists, theologians, churchmen, historians, phi-
losophers, cultural critics, playwrights, novelists, and 
journalists.
Although distinct, these three principal aspects of the 
subsequent affair are obviously interrelated. For ex-
ample, much of the reflective commentary consists of 
attempts to formulate or resolve one or more critical 
issues, and such formulations often represent impor-
tant developments of the historical aftermath.
In this essay, I shall focus on a particular development 
in the very recent historical aftermath. This involves 
primarily the accounts advanced by philosopher Paul 
Feyerabend and by historian John Heilbron. They 
raise relatively novel issues in the ongoing subsequent 
controversy.
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Feyerabend on the Galileo Affair
Let us begin with the account advanced by Feyera-
bend (1985; 1987, 247-64; 1988, 129-38; 1993, 125-
34). He portrays Galileo’s trial as involving a conflict 
between two philosophical attitudes toward, and 
historical traditions about, the role of experts. That 
is, Galileo allegedly advocated the uncritical accept-
ance by society of the views of experts, whereas the 
Church advocated the evaluation by society of the 
views of experts in the light of human and social val-
ues. Feyerabend extracts this principle from Cardinal 
Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini (cf. Finocchiaro 2014, 
78-80). Moreover, he judges the principle favorably, 
in the sense that “the Church would do well to revive 
the balance and graceful wisdom of Bellarmine, just as 
scientists constantly gain strength from the opinions 
of … their own pushy patron saint Galileo” (Feyera-
bend 1985, 164). More generally, Feyerabend claims 
that “the Church at the time of Galileo not only kept 
closer to reason as defined then and, in part, even now; 
it also considered the ethical and social consequences 
of Galileo’s views. Its indictment of Galileo was ra-
tional and only opportunism and a lack of perspective 
can demand a revision” (Feyerabend 1988, 129; 1993, 
125).
In my opinion, Feyerabend’s account is untenable. In 
part, it is not really supported by the texts to which 
he refers. However, the principal difficulty is that he 
seems to commit a fallacy of equivocation. For the 
principle in question could mean either that social 
and political leaders should evaluate the use of experts’ 
views in light of human and social values, or that sci-
entists should evaluate the truth of each other’s views 
in light of human and social values.
Now under the first interpretation, Galileo did not re-
ject the principle, but rather would have agreed with 
it. Moreover, when Feyerabend attributes this princi-
ple to Bellarmine, the documentation is unclear and 
unconvincing. In any case, in this regard, the differ-
ence between Galileo and Bellarmine was not one of 
principle but of application. For example, they would 
have disagreed on who the relevant experts were, in 
particular whether theologians should be counted as 
experts in physics and astronomy; another disagree-
ment would have been whether the views of theologi-
cal experts should be subject to the same requirement.
Under the second interpretation, the principle was 
indeed rejected and criticized by Galileo. However, 
it is in fact untenable. For this version of the princi-
ple cannot survive the objections (which we moderns 
have inherited from Galileo) against teleological and 
anthropomorphic ways of thinking; such thinking re-
duces to arguing that something is true because it is 
useful, beneficial, or good, and false because it is use-
less, harmful, or bad.
However, whether untenable or not, Feyerabend’s ac-
count is important, for at least two reasons, one histo-
riographical, the other cultural.
Historiographically speaking, Feyerabend’s account 
may be appreciated as an updated and revised con-
flictual thesis about the relationship between science 
and religion.4 It was advanced in an essay with the 
revealing title of “Galileo and the Tyranny of Truth”; 
and this essay was a contribution to a 1985 confer-
ence on “The Galileo Affair: A Meeting of Faith and 
Science,” sponsored by the Cracow Pontifical Acad-
emy of Theology and the Vatican Astronomical Ob-
servatory (cf. Coyne, Heller, and Zycínski 1985). The 
conference thus appears to have had an apologetic or 
pro-clerical aim, in the sense that it was meant to sub-
stantiate and elaborate Pope John Paul II’s harmony 
thesis regarding the relationship between science and 
religion; that is, the thesis that science and religion 
are generally in harmony with one another, and that 
in particular the Galileo affair really proves this har-
mony, rather than their incompatibility, as commonly 
thought. Feyerabend did contribute an account which 
is in one sense apologetic and pro-clerical, but which 
remains conflictual, and so is critical and anti-clerical 
in another sense. This, of course, is the kind of irony 
and iconoclasm at which Feyerabend was a master.
Note that Feyerabend is reversing not the traditional 
type of interpretation, but rather what may be called 
the traditional evaluation. In fact, at the interpre-
tive level, he sees a conflict between Galileo and the 
Church. However, at the evaluative level, he is (in the 
historical context) siding with the Church and against 
Galileo, insofar as he thinks that the principle advo-
cated by the Church was sounder than the one ad-
vanced by Galileo. At the same time, since the Church 
in the meantime has herself switched sides, the re-
sult is that Feyerabend is upholding the past Church 
against the present-day Church. The content and na-
ture of Feyerabend’s evaluation became more obvious 
later, in the 1988 edition of his book Against Method, 
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where he explicitly criticized the rehabilitation efforts 
of Saint Pope John Paul II with the (in)famous words 
I have already quoted, to the effect that the Church 
was right to condemn Galileo, and would be wrong 
to rehabilitate him now, because she was upholding 
principles of rationality, morality, and social wellbeing 
that are sounder than Galileo’s. And this substantiates 
my earlier remark that Feyerabend’s account is apol-
ogetic and pro-clerical in one sense, but critical and 
anti-clerical in another sense. However, a clarification 
about these terms is in order.
Here, the labels pro-clerical, anti-clerical, apologetic, 
pro-Galilean, and anti-Galilean are intended to have 
a descriptive, informative, and piecemeal connota-
tion, rather than a loaded, inflammatory, holistic, or 
name-calling meaning. Thus, note that I apply these 
terms primarily to theses and not to persons, and that 
in my account authors often advance views that are 
a mixture of such orientations; moreover, pro-clerical 
and pro-Galilean are not meant to be opposite. For 
example, note that here I am describing Feyerabend’s 
account as pro-clerical in one sense, but anti-clerical 
in another. The non-invidious and nonloaded charac-
ter of these terms may also be seen from the fact that 
I would have little difficulty describing certain parts 
of my own account as pro-clerical, and certain other 
parts as pro-Galilean.
My main point here is that Feyerabend’s account pro-
vides a good illustration of how an ingenious scholar 
can formulate an interesting thesis, which is an updat-
ed and sophisticated version of the traditional, other-
wise discredited, conflictual account.
A second reason for the importance of Feyerabend’s 
account is cultural, in the sense of the historical re-
percussions it has had. In fact, it has become involved 
in one of the latest twists to the subsequent Galileo 
affair, which brings the story to our own day.
On the one hand, Feyerabend’s apologia was politely 
rejected in 1989-1990 by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, 
who at the time was the chairman of the Congrega-
tion for the Doctrine of the Faith (the new name of 
the Inquisition); who in 2005 became Pope Benedict 
XVI; and who then resigned his position in 2013, thus 
becoming “Emeritus” pope. In a scholarly essay, in the 
context of an analysis of the role of faith in the revolu-
tionary geopolitical changes happening in 1989-1990, 
Cardinal Ratzinger quoted several anti-Galilean cri-
tiques, including Feyerabend’s. However, Ratzinger 
went on to criticize such views as expressions of skep-
ticism and philosophical insecurity, asserting that “it 
would be foolish to construct an impulsive apologetic 
on the basis of such views; faith does not grow out of 
resentment and skepticism with respect to rational-
ity, but only out of a fundamental affirmation and a 
spacious reasonableness … I mention all this only as 
a symptomatic case that permits us to see how deep 
the self-doubt of the modern age, of science and of 
technology goes today” (Ratzinger 1994, 98).
On the other hand, there seems to be a very wide-
spread tendency to confuse or conflate Feyerabend’s 
view with Ratzinger’s. Some authors (Socci 1993, 
62; Sinke Guimarães 2005, 6) have claimed simply 
that Cardinal Ratzinger or Pope Benedict XVI accepts 
Feyerabend’s view. Other authors (Machamer 2005; 
Saka 2006) have gone so far as to attribute this claim 
directly to Cardinal Ratzinger or Pope Benedict, 
without giving any indication that he was quoting 
Feyerabend. There have been some attempts to clarify 
the situation (Accattoli 1990, 15; Feyerabend 1993, 
133-34 n. 20; Finocchiaro 2008, 274 n. 19), but ap-
parently to no avail.
In fact, in January 2008 such confusion triggered the 
following clash (cf. Cini 2007; Anonymous 2008). A 
few months earlier, Pope Benedict XVI had accepted 
an invitation by the rector of the University of Rome 
to deliver the keynote address at the formal ceremony 
inaugurating the new academic year. This plan, how-
ever, triggered protests by students and faculty, espe-
cially in the university’s distinguished department of 
physics. They objected primarily on the grounds of the 
principle of separation of Church and State, but also 
in part because, as they stated, they felt offended and 
humiliated by the pope’s view of Galileo’s condem-
nation, expressed some twenty years earlier when the 
pope was still a cardinal; that is, by his sharing Feyer-
abend’s view. In the light of such opposition, and the 
potential for unrest and violence, the pope cancelled 
his speech.
This controversy is not helped, but rather exacerbat-
ed, by what seems to be a recurrent pattern of think-
ing or lecturing on the part of Benedict XVI, namely 
flirting with equivocation by means of quoting a con-
troversial view. For example, an analogous issue arose 
as a result of a lecture he delivered at the University 
of Regensburg on 12 September 2006, in which he 
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quoted a remark made by Byzantine emperor Manuel 
II Paleologus in 1391 regarding Islam and holy war 
(Ratzinger 2006). Now, given the post-nine-eleven 
geopolitical situation, Benedict did make a sustained 
effort to clear up the latter misunderstanding. But it 
appears that he has made no such effort regarding the 
approval of Galileo’s condemnation.
In sum, Feyerabend elaborated an account of the 
Galileo affair that is conflictualist, anti-Galilean, and 
partly pro-clerical and partly anti-clerical. He inter-
preted the controversy as rooted in a conflict between 
Galileo’s ideal of a value-free natural science, and the 
Church’s ideal of a morally and social responsible nat-
ural philosophy. And Feyerabend evaluated the two 
sides by arguing that the Church was right and Gal-
ileo wrong, or at least that she was more nearly right 
than he was. In my judgment, Feyerabend’s account is 
historically and philosophically untenable. However, 
from a methodological or historiographical point of 
view, his account represents an ingenious and clever 
version of the conflict thesis regarding the problem 
of science vs. religion. Moreover, from a cultural point 
of view, his account is significant and consequential 
insofar as it has become injected and involved into 
the latest developments and the highest levels of that 
continuing cause célèbre which is the Galileo affair.
Interesting as all this may be, in the present context 
I want to focus on something which is presumably 
even more intriguing. That is, Feyerabend exemplifies 
an unusual but important cognitive attitude, or schol-
arly approach, which combines a secular perspective 
and a clerical focus. However, before describing and 
analyzing it further, let me hasten to discuss another 
example.
Heilbron on the Galileo Affair
In 2010, John Heilbron published a massive and 
impressive biography of Galileo. Although the oc-
casion seems to have been the International Year of 
Astronomy, commemorating the 400th anniversary 
of Galileo’s telescopic discoveries, there is no ques-
tion that the book was rooted in Heilbron’s long and 
distinguished career, during which he has studied al-
most every aspect of the history of modern physics 
and astronomy, from the seventeenth to the twenti-
eth century. The book ends with a section discussing 
the prospects for the Galileo affair coming to an end 
(Heilbron 2010, 358-65). This discussion embodies 
two theses: the main and more explicit thesis is the 
prediction that sooner or later the Catholic Church 
will canonize Galileo and make him a saint; a corol-
lary and less explicit thesis is an endorsement of such 
an action to the effect that the canonization of Gali-
leo would be proper.
These conclusions are no mere afterthought designed 
to give the book an interesting and provocative end-
ing. In fact, Heilbron first discussed these ideas in a 
book published eleven years earlier, entitled The Sun 
in the Church (1999), and subtitled Cathedrals as Solar 
Observatories. In the middle of that book, in a chapter 
relating the centuries-long story of how the Church 
accommodated herself to Copernicus’s doctrine of a 
moving earth, there is a section entitled “Galilaeus 
Sanctificatus” (Heilbron 1999, 207-11); and this is 
essentially an earlier version of the 2010 discussion 
that makes up the ending of the Galileo biography. 
Moreover, about halfway between these two books, 
Heilbron (2005) contributed a chapter to a collective 
volume on The Church and Galileo, edited by Ernan 
McMullin. In that chapter, entitled “Censorship of 
Astronomy in Italy after Galileo,” although Heilbron 
does not advance the canonization thesis, or even dis-
cuss the issue, he does give a polished, synthetic, and 
neutral account of the story; and these historical de-
velopments are what provide him with the elements 
from which to argue in support of his prediction and 
endorsement in his 2010 book. In any case, that book’s 
ending does indeed contain a supporting argument, 
which is certainly not an afterthought. Let us exam-
ine that argument.
To begin with, Heilbron wisely distinguishes two 
strands in the history of the subsequent Galileo af-
fair: one pertains to the Church’s attitude toward the 
Copernican doctrine of the earth’s motion, which 
Heilbron (2010, 358-62) discusses in a section en-
titled “Off the Index”; the other strand involves the 
condemnation of Galileo the person and the Church’s 
attitude toward him, which Heilbron (2010, 362-65) 
discusses in a section entitled “On the Rota?”. The as-
tronomical-physical part of the story consists of a se-
ries of small and gradual steps designed to moderate or 
retract the Church’s opposition to Copernican astron-
omy. That story lasted about two centuries, beginning 
in 1616 when the Congregation of the Index declared 
the earth’s motion false and contrary to Scripture, and 
ending in 1835 when Galileo’s Dialogue was taken off 
the Index, after the Congregation of the Inquisition 
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had decreed in 1822 that Catholics were free to hold 
the theory of the earth’s motion in accordance with 
modern astronomy. This may strike one as the dark 
story of the commission of a monumental mistake, 
followed by a slow and reluctant recognition of the 
fact, and by various actions designed to repair the 
damage. However, Heilbron manages to find a value 
and a positive lesson, as we can see from the following 
critical appreciation of ecclesiastic behavior:
The policy of tolerating violations of the law 
when enforcement would do more harm than 
good, and annulling the law when violation has 
become ordinary practice, is often employed in 
church and state. A good administrator, like a 
good judge, knows when to be implacable and 
when to be lenient. Church officials who con-
nived at ways to elude the force of the decrees 
against Copernicanism deserve notice and cred-
it. Historians have ignored them because in not 
doing their jobs—that is, in not attempting to 
enforce a ridiculous and injurious ruling—they 
made no noise and because the imputed immo-
bility of the Church over the two hundred years 
or so between the condemnation and the re-
prieve of the Dialogue makes too good and sim-
ple a story to ruin with facts. The Roman Catho-
lic Church itself does not claim the wise inaction 
of its censors as a contribution to science in Italy. 
The Galileo Commission created at the instiga-
tion of Pope John Paul II missed an opportunity 
to blunt criticism of the Church by noticing of-
ficials who found a practical way out of the pre-
dicament into which Urban VIII and his Holy 
Office had plunged it. [Heilbron 2005, 280]
Let us now examine the other strand of the subsequent 
Galileo affair, involving the personal condemnation 
of Galileo. Heilbron stresses a number of milestones, 
as he calls them. The first occurred in 1893, with the 
encyclical Providentissimus Deus by Pope Leo XIII 
(Heilbron 2010, 362-63; cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 263-
66). It elaborates a view of the relationship between 
scientific investigation and biblical interpretation that 
corresponds to the one advocated by Galileo; the au-
thority of Scripture is explicitly limited to questions 
of faith and morals, and carries no weight for ques-
tions of physical truth and the world of nature.
The second milestone was occasioned by the tricen-
tennial of Galileo’s death in 1942 (Heilbron 2010, 
363; cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 275-94). A number of 
Church officials commemorated the event by advanc-
ing or publishing views that portrayed Galileo as a 
Catholic hero who understood and practiced the very 
important doctrine that science and religion are in 
harmony because they both derive from God: science 
studies the Work of God, religion studies His Word. 
They also credited Galileo for his spirit of sacrifice and 
piety when at the trial, in deference to unambiguous 
Church commands, he abjured his scientific beliefs.
A third milestone occurred on the 400th anniversary 
of Galileo’s birth in 1964, during the Second Vatican 
Council (Heilbron 2010, 363; cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 
326-30). In response to various churchmen’s propos-
als for a rehabilitation of Galileo, two related actions 
were taken. First, the Pontifical Academy of Scienc-
es published an important pro-Galilean biography of 
Galileo, written two decades earlier by a clergyman 
named Pio Paschini (1964). Second, in the Council’s 
constitution Gaudium et spes (approved on 7 Decem-
ber 1965), the Church affirmed explicitly the auton-
omy of science in general and deplored her wrongful 
interference in some cases in the past; and the text 
had a footnote mentioning the case of Galileo and 
referring the reader to Paschini’s book.
Finally, there was the rehabilitation of Galileo by Pope 
John Paul II in the period 1979-1992 (Heilbron 2010, 
363-64; cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 338-58). Recognizing 
the first milestone (of 1893), John Paul was explicit 
that Galileo’s hermeneutical principles, unlike those 
of his ecclesiastical opponents, were correct, and that 
they correspond to those which the Church herself 
adopted starting with Leo XIII’s Providentissimus 
Deus. Recognizing the second milestone (of 1942), 
John Paul reiterated that Galileo was also right about 
the harmony between science and religion, and that 
this doctrine also corresponds to the one which the 
Church herself holds. And John Paul went beyond the 
earlier cryptic admission of wrongdoing at the Sec-
ond Vatican Council (of 1964-65); he was clearer and 
more explicit that the condemnation of Galileo had 
been not only a mistake, but also been an injustice.
Heilbron is well aware that this strand of the affair, 
unlike the strand involving the Copernican theory, is 
not over yet. Indeed he is quite realistic about how 
long the resolution will take: in his 1999 book, he 
spoke of about 100 years; in his 2010 book, he spoke 
of about 400 years, a period equivalent to that which 
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has already elapsed. Nevertheless, Heilbron suggests 
that such rehabilitations of Galileo will continue, un-
til sooner or later they will reach the level of canoniza-
tion. The key part of his argument amounts to the fol-
lowing steps: describe the milestones just mentioned; 
point out that they obviously constitute a trend or 
tendency; postulate that the trend will continue; and 
thus reach a conclusion about the end result. Moreo-
ver, Heilbron’s case for canonization has three subsid-
iary parts.
One subsidiary part is the accumulation of judgments 
and statements about Galileo’s extraordinary and su-
perhuman virtues on the part of his many followers 
and admirers, during the past four centuries (Heilbron 
2010, 364-65). Then there is the business of his relics: 
just as for the case of other saints, various people and 
institutions are keen to find, collect, display, and re-
vere various parts of Galileo’s body (Heilbron 2010, 
365). Thirdly, Heilbron sees it fit to defend Galileo’s 
canonization prospects from a crucial possible objec-
tion, involving miracles. Here, Heilbron’s words are 
worth quoting:
It might be objected that Galileo performed no 
miracles. What then were the miracles of Thom-
as Aquinas? In fact, Galileo performed a stupen-
dous miracle. He obliterated the ancient distinc-
tion between the celestial and terrestrial realms, 
raised the earth to the heavens, made the planets 
so many earths, and revealed that our moon is 
not unique in the universe. Not since the creation 
had there been such a refashioning. Then there 
was the miracle of himself, a rare combinations 
of talents and personalities, who, despite mania 
and depression, arthritis, gout, hernias, blindness, 
and overindulgence in wine and wit lived to write 
three books—the [Sidereal] Messenger, the Dia-
logue, and the Discourse—any one of which would 
have given him enduring fame. [Heilbron 2010, 
365]
Heilbron ends his book with the following rhetori-
cal question: “According to Galileo’s mechanics, the 
slightest force can move the greatest weight given 
sufficient time. The direction of motion is clear. Who 
can doubt that within another 400 years the church 
will recognize Galileo’s divine gifts, atone for his suf-
ferings, ignore his arrogance, and make him a saint?” 
(Heilbron 2010, 365).
I believe that Heilbron’s prediction cannot be dis-
missed. I have tried to reconstruct his argument in a 
plausible and sympathetic light. The fact that he gives 
such an argument means that it would be irrelevant to 
object that he is not serious, and does not really mean 
what he says. For even if that were the case, it would 
not invalidate the argument and evidence presented. 
Nevertheless, I am not sure I share Heilbron’s predic-
tion, and I do not find his argument convincing. The 
key weakness is the following.
If we study the milestones of the Church’s rehabili-
tation efforts described above, they each had a dark, 
negative, anti-Galilean side. Leo’s encyclical Prov-
identissimus Deus of 1893 does not even mention 
Galileo, let alone credit him with the right herme-
neutics. The tricentennial rehabilitation of 1942 in-
cluded the censorship and non-publication of the bi-
ography commissioned to Paschini by the Pontifical 
Academy of Sciences, on the grounds that the book 
was too pro-Galilean and anti-Jesuitical. The actions 
at the Second Vatican Council of 1964-65 includ-
ed the publication of Paschini’s book in a censored 
version, consisting of the deletion or revision of the 
more pro-Galilean and anti-Jesuitical passages. John 
Paul’s rehabilitation of 1979-1992 included the fol-
lowing paradox spread by the chairman of the Vatican 
Commission on Galileo (Cardinal Paul Poupard) and 
uncritically accepted by the pope: that although Gal-
ileo was right, and his ecclesiastical opponents wrong, 
with regard to biblical interpretation and hermeneu-
tical questions, the reverse was the case with regard 
to scientific, methodological, and epistemological 
questions; Galileo was not aware of the weaknesses of 
his pro-Copernican arguments and evidence and of 
the epistemological limitations in general of scientif-
ic arguments for establishing the truth, whereas Pope 
Urban VIII and Cardinal Bellarmine were, and they 
attempted without success to enlighten Galileo about 
it. This is an old apologetic strategy first elaborated 
by Pierre Duhem (1908; 1969), and recently updated 
by a German clergyman named Walter Brandmüller 
(1982; 1992).
I do not want to give the impression that Heilbron 
is unaware that the various rehabilitation milestones 
have such anti-Galilean aspects. There is no question 
that he knows about them, since his discussion men-
tions and describes them. However, what I am saying 
is that Heilbron does not seem to realize that the ex-
istence of this other side in the Church’s rehabilita-
tion efforts casts doubt on what we can predict about 
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the end result. For this anti-Galilean side amounts to 
the existence in this story of another trend opposing 
the one on which he focuses and which he wants to 
extrapolate into the future. I think both conflicting 
trends must be taken into account. If we do that, the 
safer and more plausible prediction to make is that in 
the next rehabilitation effort something will be done 
to credit Galileo in some way and admit some eccle-
siastic wrongdoing, but in such a way as to come up 
short of a full-fledged Galilean exoneration and cler-
ical retraction, perhaps on account of some previous-
ly neglected, or recently updated, or newly invented 
Galilean flaw. Extrapolating this pattern onto the fi-
nal end result 100 or 400 or 1000 years from now, the 
chances are that we will have the following outcome. 
To echo the words with which Heilbron concludes 
his book, “the church will recognize Galileo’s divine 
gifts, atone for his suffering, ignore his arrogance” 
(Heilbron 2010, 365) but refuse (I say) “to make him a 
saint” (Heilbron 2010, 365).
For example, the issue of miracles, which Heilbron 
tries to pre-empt and defuse, could easily provide such 
a pretext. In fact, miracles are a very serious business 
for the Church, and must be conceived in a materi-
al sort of way that involves concrete deliverance from 
physical ailments afflicting real living persons; they 
cannot be conceived as intellectual or mental achieve-
ments, as Heilbron seems to do. And the case of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, which Heilbron attempts to utilize, 
confirms this and underscores the difficulties which 
Galileo’s canonization would have. Aquinas died in 
1274 and was canonized by Pope John XXII, at Avi-
gnon, within fifty years (in 1323). As Aquinas’s latest 
biographer states, the bull of canonization, which “ex-
tolled the 300 miracles by the new saint … is not … 
explicit on Thomas’s intellectual work” (Torrell 1996, 
1:321). I conclude that if feats like the Christianiza-
tion of Aristotle did not help Aquinas become a saint, 
it is unlikely that Galileo’s raising the earth to the 
heavens would facilitate his canonization.
In a sense, Heilbron’s argument is a typical example 
of the pitfalls to which almost everyone is irresistibly 
drawn in the business of making predictions about the 
future based on the existence of demonstrated or de-
monstrable past tendencies or trends. The pitfalls in-
volve the assumption that the past trends will contin-
ue, and the neglect of countervailing trends. The most 
spectacular and culturally significant such prediction 
with such pitfalls was Karl Marx’s prediction in the 
nineteenth century of the downfall of capitalism. One 
could conceptualize this problem by defining a corre-
sponding logical fallacy and exploring general prin-
ciples for avoiding it, but such logical theorizing and 
criticism are beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
Instead, my aim here is to conceptualize Heilbron’s 
account (as well as Feyerabend’s) in general methodo-
logical terms. To that theme I now turn.
The Berkeley Para-clerical Approach
Recall that, for the case of Feyerabend’s account of 
the Galileo affair, I had not only some substantive 
criticism, but also some methodological appreciation. 
Similarly, for the case of Heilbron’s canonization the-
sis, I have just articulated a substantive criticism of 
its supporting argument. However, this criticism of 
Heilbron should not make you forget that I devoted 
even more time and space to a sympathetic reconstruc-
tion of his position, on the firm belief in the scholarly 
originality and cultural importance of his canoniza-
tion thesis and the canonization issue in general. Still, 
all this is relatively preliminary, and however inter-
esting it may be, it does not yet touch something else 
which is potentially even more important, namely the 
similarities between Feyerabend and Heilbron.
To be sure, there are many differences between Feyer-
abend and Heilbron, disciplinary as well as biograph-
ical, general as well as particular, formal as well as 
substantive. For example, Feyerabend is a philosopher, 
Heilbron a historian; also, note that their positions are 
at almost opposite ends of the evaluative spectrum. 
However, here I want to stress the characteristics they 
share.
There are at least four things which they seen to 
have in common. First, they both hail from Berkeley. 
Heilbron studied and was trained at the University 
of California, Berkeley; he taught there from 1967 to 
1994; he founded and directed its Office for the His-
tory of Science and Technology; he served as univer-
sity Vice-Chancellor (of academic affairs) for several 
years, until he retired; and he has continued his as-
sociation with this institution. As for Feyerabend, he 
taught at Berkeley for more than 30 years, even longer 
than Heilbron, from 1958 to 1989. Note, in particular, 
that they were colleagues for about 22 years.
Second, neither Feyerabend nor Heilbron are Galile-
an specialists; that is, Galileo is not their first, main, 
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or only scholarly concern. On the contrary, they were 
drawn to Galileo by other interests. In Feyerabend’s 
case, he began working in the philosophy of physics, 
quantum mechanics in particular; then, partly un-
der the influence of Karl Popper, Feyerabend made 
some contributions to general methodology. The key 
link was provided by the historical approach to the 
philosophy of science, that is, the use of the history 
of science to formulate and test philosophical claims 
about the nature of science, especially the utilization 
of significant episodes or great figures such as the Co-
pernican Revolution and Galileo. In Heilbron’s case, 
his primary interest may be said to be the history of 
physics, modern physics of the past four centuries; his 
earlier work dealt with atomic physics in the twen-
tieth century, and with electricity in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Whether or not one accepts 
Albert Einstein’s and Stephen Hawking’s judgment 
of Galileo as the father of modern physics (Einstein 
1954, 271; Hawking 1988, 179), it is not surprising 
that a historian of physics with broad interests would 
sooner or later develop views about Galileo and find 
reasons to write them down. The importance of this 
shared trait is that it gives them a perspective on Gal-
ilean topics, relatively free of vested interests.
Third, both Feyerabend and Heilbron are master lit-
erary stylists, whose prose is anything but prosaic, but 
rather full of wit, irony, sarcasm, humor, double enten-
dre, playfulness, and many other figures of speech that 
are beyond my own repertoire. This shared character-
istic may seem irrelevant, but is important for at least 
two reasons. First, they share such a literary and rhe-
torical dimension with Galileo himself, and so in part 
they may have learned it from him and may thereby be 
trying to emulate him. Second, such a practice raises 
the question of whether what they say can or should 
be taken literally or at face value. In Feyerabend’s case, 
there are well-known examples when he was pressed 
to elaborate and defend his published claims, and re-
sponded by saying that he had been playacting, being 
an iconoclast and a provocateur. And in Heilbron’s 
case, I raised the issue earlier, resolving it by pointing 
out that, playacting or not, in his writings on the is-
sue of Galileo’s canonization there is argumentation 
and evidence which is real and consequential, even if 
introduced in a playacting mode. Still, the rhetorical 
dimension of the writing and work of Feyerabend, 
Heilbron, and Galileo may lend itself to a twist, as we 
shall see later.
Be that as it may, a more important trait of Feyer-
abend’s and Heilbron’s accounts of the Galileo af-
fair is the following. Both Feyerabend and Heilbron 
are secular-minded scholars, and yet they are keenly 
concerned with questions about the relationship be-
tween science and religion. Moreover, their writings 
on this topic often contain frank advice to the Catho-
lic Church about the conduct of her Galilean affairs. 
Furthermore, they often credit the Church, or defend 
her, in ways which Catholics themselves, clergymen 
or not, would not dare to do. It’s as if Feyerabend 
and Heilbron believe that some Catholic affairs are 
too important to be left to Catholics themselves. This 
sort of attitude and practice takes intellectual courage, 
strong self-confidence, analytical subtlety, and experi-
enced judgment.
Such an attitude and approach are clearly reminiscent 
of Galileo’s own. In this regard, one revealing remark 
is found in a letter Galileo wrote just after the con-
demnation of Copernicanism in 1616 (cf. Finocchi-
aro 2014, 108-109). Heilbron mentions it on more 
than one occasion, and describes the situation by 
saying that “Galileo occasionally referred to himself 
as a saint in his self-appointed mission to enlight-
en the Church” (Heilbron 1999, 211; cf. 2010, 364). 
This Galilean saintly self-image is part of Heilbron’s 
case for the canonization thesis. However, I take it 
as evidence of the approach of secular-minded con-
cern with, and service to, religion and the Church. 
Another important occasion when Galileo expressed 
his secular-minded concern with religion is in the 
classic Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, in which 
he defends himself from the clerical criticism that he 
is a heretic because he believes in the earth’s motion, 
which contradicts Scripture. In the introductory part 
of this essay, he gives some background information 
and makes a number of clarifications. One of these 
is the following contrast between the attitude of his 
enemies and his own:
They always shield themselves with a simulated 
religious zeal, and they also try to involve Holy 
Scripture and to make it somehow subservient 
to their insincere objectives; against the intention 
of Scripture and of the Holy Fathers (if I am not 
mistaken), they want to extend, not to say abuse, 
its authority, so that even for purely physical con-
clusions which are not matters of faith one must 
totally abandon the senses and demonstrative ar-
guments in favor of any scriptural passage whose 
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apparent words may contain a different indica-
tion. Here I hope to demonstrate that I proceed 
with much more pious and religious zeal than 
they when I propose not that this book [Coper-
nicus’s Revolutions] should not be condemned, 
but that it should not be condemned without 
understanding, examining, or even seeing it, as 
they would like. [Galilei 2008, 113-14]
This approach which I have extracted from Feyera-
bend and Heilbron, and which I have also attributed 
to Galileo, has more cultural resonance and presence 
than it may appear at first. I believe it corresponds 
to the fundamental inspiration, motivation, and aim 
of the International Society for Science and Religion, 
the scholars associated with it, and the works that rep-
resent it. Here, as supporting evidence I would cite a 
book entitled A Companion to the ISSR Library of Sci-
ence and Religion, edited by Pranab Das (2011), con-
sisting of reviews of 224 books on the topic.
Furthermore, despite the indisputable Berkeley con-
nection, it goes without saying that many scholars 
not associated with Berkeley practice such a meth-
odological approach. In this regard, I would mention 
Agassi (1971), Blackwell (1991; 1998a; 1998b; 2006), 
DiCanzio (1996), Fantoli (2003; 2012), Pera (1998), 
and Segre (1997; 1998), just to limit myself to good 
examples from the field of Galilean studies, which I 
know best.5
On the other hand, I would not say that this approach 
constitutes a school. For I do not think that the num-
ber of practitioners is sufficiently large or that their 
critical mass is great enough; nor has their self-re-
flective awareness and articulation of the approach 
reached a sufficient degree of explicitness; and the 
same applies to the degree of scholarly and academic 
organization. In this regard, I would contrast this sit-
uation with the historical approach to the philosophy 
of science, which does seem to have all the requisites 
to be a school.
Similarly, it should be added that many Berkeley 
scholars have done excellent work on the interaction 
between science and religion, but do not practice this 
methodological approach; and this applies even to 
some outstanding Galileo scholars, such as Biagioli 
(1993; 2006). My point is that this approach, impor-
tant and fruitful as I believe it is, has no monopoly on 
truth and goodness.
Nevertheless, the Berkeley connection cannot be dis-
missed lightly, for it cannot be a fortuitous coinci-
dence that another distinguished practitioner of this 
approach holds a history Ph.D. from there, namely 
Ronald Numbers (1993; 2009; cf. Das 2011, 133-
36). Numbers, who was awarded the Sarton Medal 
in 2008, studies the history of scientific creationism, 
and manages to follow a secular-minded approach on 
questions about the relationship between evolution-
ary biology and biblical creationism. More generally, 
he conceived the project of bringing together schol-
ars who have contributed to dispelling myths about 
science and religion, from the ancient Greeks to the 
twenty-first century; and then he edited a collection 
of resulting essays under the title Galileo Goes to Jail 
and Other Myths about Science and Religion. Numbers’s 
concluding words in the book’s introduction give a 
good flavor of the approach I am trying to articulate:
The contributors to this volume have no obvious 
scientific or theological axes to grind. Nearly half, 
twelve of twenty-five, self-identify as agnostic or 
atheist (that is, unbelievers in religion). Among 
the remaining thirteen there are five mainstream 
Protestants, two evangelical Protestants, one Ro-
man Catholic, one Jew, one Muslim, one Bud-
dhist—and two whose beliefs fit no conventional 
category (including one pious Spinozist). Over 
half of the unbelievers, including me, grew up in 
devout Christian homes—some as fundamental-
ists or evangelicals—but subsequently lost their 
faith. I am not sure exactly what to make of this 
fact, but I suspect it tells us something about why 
we care so much about setting the record straight. 
[Numbers 2009, 6-7]
What I would add is that we are dealing with a cog-
nitive phenomenon important enough to deserve 
a name. Partly echoing Numbers, and retaining the 
Berkeley connection, we could call this approach and 
these scholars “Berkeley clerical fact-checkers.” But 
such emphasis on setting the record straight and fact 
checking strikes me as too naïve, uncritical, or posi-
tivistic. Perhaps we could label it the “Berkeley cleri-
cal pundit syndrome”; but the term syndrome would 
carry too negative a connotation. A more positive de-
scription would be “Berkeley clerical rescue service”; 
but that is perhaps too positive and somewhat crass. I 
think it may be best to drop all the terms introducing 
extra or extraneous connotations, and retain the bare 
essentials. Perhaps that would be accomplished by 
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calling it simply the “Berkeley para-clerical” approach.
At this point someone might object to my label by 
suggesting that the word Berkeley be replaced by the 
word Galilean or by the term Feyerabendian-Heilbro-
nian, or be dropped altogether. However, this seman-
tical question is relatively unimportant, and I shall not 
pursue it here. It is more important to try to describe 
and analyze this approach more clearly, more precise-
ly, and more deeply, to which I now turn.
Numbers’s Version of the 
Para-clerical Approach
In the context of the Galileo affair, and more general-
ly the interaction between science and religion, I have 
illustrated and introduced what I call the Berkeley pa-
ra-clerical approach. So far I have characterized this 
approach in terms of being secular-minded, offering 
advice to the Church, crediting the Church for un-
common reasons, defending the Church from com-
mon criticism, believing in the superiority of religious 
outsiders over insiders, and intellectual courage. These 
traits require some elaboration.
Let us focus on just two things. First, although the 
term secularism can be given various nuances of mean-
ing, I believe a common core of all is the connotation 
of some kind of “indifference to or rejection or exclu-
sion of religion and religious considerations.”6 Having 
said this, the next question that immediately arises for 
the analyst is: what exactly are indifference, rejection, 
and exclusion. Still, to have said this is not totally 
opaque or unhelpful. Secondly, to believe or act as if 
Church affairs and history are too important to be left 
to churchmen or religious believers, whatever else it 
may imply, certainly implies that on such topics the 
secular or nonreligious investigator has an advantage 
over an investigator who is a religious believer.
Thus, here we have two specific attitudes that are an-
ti-clerical, in the sense of being critical of or opposed 
to the Church. On the other hand, in the Berkeley 
para-clerical approach, one displays such an attitude 
in order to perform a service to the Church by offer-
ing useful advice, giving her due credit, and defending 
her from unfair criticism; and here we have three dis-
tinct pro-clerical attitudes. I believe that in so doing 
the para-clerical scholar is trying to properly combine 
the pros and the cons, in the belief that the topic is 
so important that one must avoid being one-sided or 
going too far along any one side. In other words, we 
are talking about committed and critical impartiality 
or judiciousness.
Such clarifications are useful partly because some of 
Ron Numbers’s self-reflections explicitly bring out 
such a perspective. To begin with, Numbers’s choice 
of topic is precisely what one would expect from such 
impartiality or judiciousness. Referring to his history 
of scientific creationism, Numbers insightfully says: 
“In writing this history, I have chosen to concentrate 
on those creationists who possessed, or claimed to 
possess, scientific credentials. This might strike some 
readers as an odd choice of topic for a historian of 
science, but I would submit that one of the best ways 
to learn about the history of ‘science’ is to explore 
how interested parties have contested its boundaries. 
Many books in recent years have sought to discred-
it creationism scientifically or theologically, but only 
a few have examined the movement historically …” 
(Numbers 1993, p. xiv).
Here, Numbers is using one connotation of the term 
historical to clarify his own approach. According to this 
connotation, to be historical is to be objective. In turn, 
objectivity does not mean being merely descriptive 
and avoiding evaluation altogether, which is impossi-
ble and self-defeating when the topic is a contested or 
controversial one. Rather, in such contexts, objectivity 
means being accurate in one’s descriptions and fair in 
one’s evaluations. And fairness in turn means avoiding 
one-sidedness and taking all sides properly into ac-
count, although of course this is not a mechanical task 
that can be reduced to following simple and precise 
rules, such as splitting the difference between the op-
posite sides; rather, it involves essentially the exercise 
of judgment.
Next, one of the major theses which Numbers elab-
orates may be regarded as an illustration of the pa-
ra-clerical approach. This thesis is a substantive claim 
about the history of scientific creationism, and it as-
serts, in his own words:
Rather than finding clerics arrayed in simple 
opposition to scientists, we discover conflicts 
of a different sort: psychological, as creationists 
struggled to reconcile the apparently conflicting 
claims of science and Scripture; and social, as 
they quarreled with one another over competing 
scientific and biblical interpretations or contest-
ed the boundaries of science and religion with 
evolutionists in courthouses, legislative halls, and 
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school-board rooms. In virtually every public 
battle, even when creationists squared off against 
evolutionists, scientists and preachers could be 
found on both sides, and sometimes in unex-
pected numbers. For example, … the Arkansas 
creation-evolution trial of 1981 … prompted the 
Protestant theologian Langdon Gilkey … to ob-
serve that the only “warfare” in Little Rock found 
“liberal religion and liberal science on the one 
side, and absolutist religion and its appropriate 
‘science’ on the other.” [Numbers 1993, pp. xiv-
xv]
Finally, Numbers’s criticism of alternative approaches 
adds another variation on the same theme:
For too long now students of science and reli-
gion have tended to grant the former a privileged 
position, often writing more as partisans than 
historians and grading religious “beliefs” by how 
much they encouraged or retarded the growth of 
scientific “knowledge.” Recently we have heard 
persuasive calls for a more even-handed treat-
ment. But even academics who would have no 
trouble empathetically studying fifteenth-centu-
ry astrology, seventeenth-century alchemy, and 
nineteenth-century phrenology seem to lose 
their nerve when they approach twentieth-cen-
tury creationism and its fundamentalist propo-
nents … In other words, although many scholars 
seem to have no trouble respecting the uncon-
ventional beliefs and behaviors of peoples chron-
ologically and geographically removed from us, 
they substitute condemnation for comprehen-
sion when scrutinizing their own neighbors. I 
think it is profitable to get acquainted with the 
neighbors, especially so if we find them so threat-
ening. [Numbers 1993, pp. xvi-xvii]
Here, Numbers uses the notions of “non-partisanship” 
and “even-handedness” as two additions to that family 
of terms which I have been extracting: impartiality, 
judiciousness, objectivity, and judgment calls.
It seems to me that Numbers’s self-reflective pro-
nouncements are not only important in themselves, 
but also revealing with regard to the para-clerical ap-
proach. In fact, such self-reflections may be usefully 
compared to those we find in a work which was pro-
duced by another Berkeley Ph.D., and which was pub-
lished in 1989 by the University of California Press as 
the inaugural volume of the California Studies in the 
History of Science. This book is a collection of the 
most important documents pertaining to the trial and 
condemnation of Galileo from 1613 to 1633. Here is 
how he summarizes the approach he is advocating, 
at the end of a methodological and historiographical 
discussion in the Introduction:
To summarize, a balanced approach to the study 
of the Galileo affair must avoid the two opposite 
extremes exemplified by the anti-Galilean and 
the anti-Catholic interpretations. There is no 
easy way of doing this, but it may help to distin-
guish scientific from epistemological issues, fac-
tual correctness from rational correctness, essen-
tial correctness from total correctness, the several 
epistemological issues from each other, intellec-
tual from external factors, and the several exter-
nal factors from each other (personal, psycholog-
ical, social, economic, and political). However … 
these distinct entities are also interrelated, so the 
point is not to deny their interaction, but to make 
sure they are not confused with one another.7
Let me add here the usual caveat about theory vs. prac-
tice; that is, more important than saying such things 
and expressing such self-reflective pronouncements is 
to actually do them and to put them into practice in 
one’s investigations. Indeed, just as Numbers practices 
in the course of his investigation what he preaches in 
the pronouncements quoted earlier, so does this other 
scholar. This is evident from the reactions of readers, 
who easily recognize that the book does follow this 
approach. One such reader is a distinguished outsider, 
legal scholar Alan Dershowitz, who writes: “The Gali-
leo Affair should be required reading for everyone who 
values freedom and fears censorship. The extraordi-
nary virtue of this collection of documents … is that 
it presents both sides of the dispute. ‘Both sides?’ you 
are probably thinking. Is there really a procensorship 
side of this particular debate that is worth reading? 
In answering that question, it must be recalled that at 
the time Galileo published his arguments, there was 
no dispositive empirical evidence that he was correct” 
(Dershowitz 1991).
Finally, besides the methodological similarity (at both 
the reflective and practical levels) between Numbers 
and this other Berkeley graduate, it is simply uncan-
ny to find another similarity with regard to a main 
substantive thesis that illustrates the approach. I am 
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referring to Numbers’s thesis (mentioned above) that, 
in the history of the creation vs. evolution controversy, 
the real conflict has been not between science and re-
ligion, but between liberal science and religion on one 
side and absolutist science and religion on the other. 
Here is what this other author has written regarding 
this topic: “Because the Galileo Affair involved a con-
flict between one of the founders of modern science 
and one of the world’s great religious institutions, it 
has traditionally been taken as an example of the war-
fare between science and religion … [However] even 
a cursory reading of the relevant documents shows 
that many churchmen were on his side and many sci-
entists were on the opposite side; thus, there was a 
split within both science and religion, along the lines 
of what may be called conservation and innovation; 
so the real conflict was between a conservative and a 
progressive attitude.” 8
Conclusion
I have been arguing that the methodological self-re-
flections of Numbers and this other scholar not only 
correspond to each other in tone and content, but 
also correspond to the methodological practices of 
Feyerabend and Heilbron in their accounts of the 
Galileo affair. Those self-reflections correspond to 
one another insofar as they both stress notions such 
as impartiality, judiciousness, objectivity, non-parti-
sanship, even-handedness, and balanced judgment 
in the handling of controversial topics such as the 
Galileo affair, creation vs. evolution, and science vs. 
religion in general. And they correspond to the Feyer-
abend-Heilbron approach to the Galileo affair, which 
attempts to combine a generally secular and clerically 
external perspective with a concern to help, appreci-
ate, and defend the Church when appropriate.
I have named this the Berkeley para-clerical approach, 
because it has been pioneered by these Berkeley pro-
fessors and graduates. However, I have indicated that 
it is much more widespread than such a label might 
suggest. For example, I have argued that it is reminis-
cent of the approach which Galileo himself followed 
in matters of science vs. religion. I have also point-
ed out that this approach is practiced by a number 
of non-Berkeley scholars. And I have suggested that 
this approach is important and fruitful, and deserves 
even greater adoption. At the same time I have made 
it clear that this approach, like any other, is not in-
fallible; and my substantive criticism of Feyerabend’s 
and Heilbron’s accounts may be taken to show this. 
Indeed infallibility is one of those religious doctrines 
toward which the para-clericals can only show indif-
ference, rejection, or exclusion, to echo the canonical 
dictionary definition of secularism quoted above.
Finally, some personal clarifications and qualifications 
are in order. First, it is obvious that the fourth scholar 
cited above is the present writer; thus, the referenc-
es and quotations given above are offered as evidence 
that I do indeed practice the para-clerical approach. 
Moreover, there is no doubt that I learned this ap-
proach at Berkeley; that is, in part from Feyerabend 
and Heilbron, who were my teachers and dissertation 
advisors. Additionally, my doctoral dissertation was 
not on Galileo, but on the historiography of science, 
in the sense of the philosophy and methodology of the 
history of science (Finocchiaro 1973); like them, only 
later was I drawn to Galileo, partly because one of my 
historiographical case studies was Alexandre Koyré’s 
work on Galileo, and that led me to learn more about 
Galileo. However, another reason for my attraction to 
Galileo was that I felt he could serve as a good model 
to emulate in the search for the truth and acquisition 
of knowledge; and of course, the emulation could only 
be judicious and critical, and not mechanical or blind.
On the other hand, recall that, as presented above, the 
Berkeley para-clerical approach includes (as a minor 
component) the literary style and rhetorical flourish 
which Feyerabend and Heilbron, and indeed Galileo, 
like to use and display. And in this regard, for better 
or worse, I am not sure I have yet mastered, or ever 
learned, this Feyerabendian-Heilbronian style and 
rhetoric, especially the double-entendre and playful-
ness. In any case, even if I had, I might not want to 
use or display it on the present occasion. Thus, I hope 
readers will resist the temptation to misinterpret my 
rhetoric of Berkeley para-clericalism; they should not 
just dismiss it, or take it as mere rhetoric; but also they 
should not take that rhetoric more seriously than the 
substance of how this approach actually studies the 
relationship between Galileo and the Church, crea-
tionism and evolutionism, and more generally science 
and religion. In short, readers should be even-handed 
and impartial in their analysis of my rhetoric.
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